The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience by Cavanagh, Edward D.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 41
Issue 3 Spring 2010 Article 12
2010
The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the
American Experience
Edward D. Cavanagh
St. John's University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward D. Cavanagh, The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the American Experience, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 629 (2010).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss3/12
The Private Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the
American Experience
Edward D. Cavanagh*
I. INTRODUCTION
The treble damage remedy has been a centerpiece of private antitrust
enforcement since the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890.1 Aware
that government resources were limited, Congress created the private
right of action as a complement to public enforcement to assure the
detection and prosecution of antitrust offenders. 2  The private right of
action has proven to be a very potent weapon in the civil enforcement
arsenal.3 It is the very potency of the private remedy, however, that has
made the private right of action a target of criticism by defendants and,
more recently, the courts. 4  Indeed, in the last decade, the private
remedy has been the subject of a full-scale siege in the federal courts.
Ironically, at the very time the private antitrust remedy is seemingly
in eclipse in the United States, antitrust enforcement authorities in
Europe5 and elsewhere are contemplating adoption of the private right
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. This article was originally
presented as a paper at the George Washington University School of Law Conference on Private
Enforcement of Competition Law on February 28, 2009. The author wishes to thank the
participants in that conference and especially Professor Stephen Calkins for their very helpful
comments on prior drafts of this article. Portions of this article have been adapted from Edward
D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages in Monopolization Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 97
(2009) and used with permission.
1. The provision for mandatory trebling is currently housed in section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
2. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) ("Congress sought to create
a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their
illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations.").
3. See Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Treble damages are a potent
remedy.").
4. See, e.g., Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-559 (2007) (citing sources
emphasizing the high cost of discovery in antitrust litigation); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 882-83 (2004) (warning that where an industry is
regulated, costly private antitrust litigation may be unjustifiable in that industry because it risks
"chill[ing] the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect")
5. See Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Beach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
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of action. 6 As in the United States, neither the European Commission
nor the competition authorities in member states have the resources to
detect and prosecute all antitrust transgressions so as to promote a
"competition culture" in Europe.7 This Article examines the private
remedy through the lens of the American system and offers some
observations about the American experience that may prove useful in
designing private remedies schemes in antitrust regimes abroad.
II. THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part will summarize the elements of the private right of action in
the United States, followed by an explanation of the objectives it seeks
to accomplish.
A. Features
Under section 4 of the Clayton Act,8 "any person injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws" may sue for recovery in federal court. Section 4 further provides
that: (1) the litigants are entitled to a trial by jury; (2) any damage award
from the jury is automatically trebled by the court; and (3) a prevailing
antitrust plaintiff (but not a prevailing defendant) is entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees as well as treble damages. 9 Under section 5
of the Clayton Act, a final decree in favor of the government in any
public enforcement proceeding "shall be prima facie evidence" in any
subsequent private action on the same claim. 10 In addition, the parties
are entitled to broad pretrial discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which authorize discovery of "any matter, not privileged
relevant to any claim or defense."' I Finally, many antitrust actions are
brought as class actions. 12 As a result, defendants' financial exposure
COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2005/com2005_0672en01.pdf (identifying obstacles and potential solutions to improve
damage actions under competition law); Andrew I. Gavil, The Challenges of Economic Proof in a
Decentralized and Privatized European Competition Policy System: Lessons from the American
Experience, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 177, 184 (2008) ("The Green Paper is focused on
private competition law actions by injured parties.").
6. John Pheasant, Private Antitrust Damages in Europe: The Policy Debate and Judicial
Developments, 21 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2006) ("There is widespread support in Europe for the
principle that legal and natural persons who suffered loss as a result of an antitrust infringement
should be entitled to recover damages to compensate them for that loss.").
7. Id. at 59.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 16.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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may increase significantly. At the same time, the class action
mechanism permits an efficient resolution of multiple claims that is
binding on all class members.
B. The Rationale from the Private Treble Damages Remedy
Mandatory treble damages are a key ingredient of the private right of
action under the United States antitrust laws. The merits of mandatory
trebling have been debated extensively over the last century, 13 most
recently by the Antitrust Modernization Commission, which concluded
that the treble damages remedy should be retained in all antitrust
cases. 14 Historically, mandatory trebling in private antitrust actions has
served four interrelated goals: (1) compensation of victims; (2)
deterrence; (3) forfeiture of ill-gotten gains; and (4) punishment. 15
1. Compensation
First, trebling assures that victims of antitrust violations will be fairly
compensated. 16 Public enforcement actions generally do not provide
any monetary recovery for individual losses. 17 Furthermore, even the
most diligent enforcers are unable to uncover all antitrust violations.
Because of their typically covert nature, antitrust violations are
frequently difficult to detect and very expensive to prosecute. Trebling
creates strong incentives for private parties to investigate, detect, and
prosecute antitrust violations. 18
If antitrust recoveries were limited to actual damages, private parties
would have little motivation to sue, given the unpredictability and high
costs of antitrust litigation. Nor would actual damages provide
13. For a summary of that debate, see Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 783-88 (1987) [hereinafter Cavanagh,
Detrebling Antitrust].
14. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 245-
48, 287-88 (2007), available at www.amc.gov [hereinafter AMC REPORT].
15. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages in Monopolization Cases, 76
ANTITRUST L.J. 97, 100 (2009).
16. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (noting that treble
damages "would provide ample compensation to victims of antitrust violations").
17. But see Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h
(2006), which provides that state attorney generals may sue parens patriae on behalf of
consumers who are natural persons and have been injured by price-fixing. However, the parens
patriae provision of Hart-Scott-Rodino was largely thwarted by the subsequent Supreme Court
ruling in Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977), which held that only direct
purchasers could recover for illegal overcharges imposed by antitrust violators, thereby
precluding consumer recoveries in most cases.
18. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J. L. & ECON. 445, 451
(1985) (arguing that creating incentives to find and prosecute violations is essential).
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sufficient compensation in all cases. To illustrate, in horizontal cases
affecting price, the normal measure of damages is the overcharge-the
difference between the price paid for the goods in question and the price
that would have prevailed had there been competition. 19 Additionally,
in cases involving monopolistic overcharges, the measure of damages is
the difference between the price paid and the price that would have
prevailed but for the defendant's wrongful conduct.20 Victims of price-
fixing or monopolistic overcharges are thus not repaid for all economic
losses suffered because of the antitrust violations, including lost
opportunity costs and prejudgment interest,21 nor are business entities
compensated for losses incurred by diversion of company executives
from normal business activities and other organizational disruptions
caused by a lawsuit.22
More importantly, overcharges alone tend to under-tax the antitrust
violator for the harm caused by its illegal conduct because the
overcharges, which are really transfers of consumer surplus from
victimized buyers to conspiring sellers, are only part of the harm
inflicted by the illegal conduct.23 Horizontal restraints on price or
output, as well as monopolistic behavior, create an inefficient allocation
of resources, thereby causing a net loss to society as a whole and
creating the so-called welfare triangle. 24  The loss in efficiency
attributable to cartelization varies from case to case, depending on a
number of factors including the nature of the restraint, the industry
involved, and the time-frame and scope of the conspiracy.
Nevertheless, quantifying loss in efficiency is a difficult real world
exercise. Here, mandatory trebling may serve as a surrogate measure of
actual damages, providing antitrust victims with rough justice.25
Similarly, trebling provides rough justice in cases involving
concerted refusals to deal with unlawful exclusionary conduct by
monopolists, where the measure of damages is normally lost profits.26
Antitrust violations typically distort the market mechanism so as to
make re-creation of the "but for" market and thus reasonable estimates
19. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906).
20. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.3d 263, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1979).
21. The Antitrust Modernization Commission considered but ultimately rejected a proposal to
award prejudgment interest to prevailing plaintiffs. AMC REPORT, supra note 14, at 249.
22. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 101.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHflO
ST. L.J. 115, 118 (1993).
26. See, e.g., LePage's, Inc. v. 3M Co., 324 F.3d 141, 164-66 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (claims arising for monopolization through bundled rebates).
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of lost profits a difficult task.27 While trebling may not precisely
counterbalance the market distortions caused by unlawful conduct in
every case, it does provide plaintiffs a greater likelihood of meaningful
compensation and hence greater incentives to prosecute violators than
would be the case if lost profits alone were the measure of recovery.
28
2. Deterrence
Second, mandatory trebling serves to deter antitrust violations.
29
Because many antitrust violations are concealable and hence difficult to
detect, the benefits from engaging in illegal conduct are potentially
enormous. Mandatory trebling creates significant incentives for private
parties to enforce the antitrust laws as private attorney generals. In
enacting the antitrust laws, Congress recognized that the government
lacked sufficient resources to detect and prosecute all antitrust
violations and that mandatory trebling would increase prosecution of
antitrust violators and enhance the overall goals of antitrust
enforcement. 30
Equally important, trebling ensures that private actions will go
forward even when the Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade
Commission, or state enforcers, for whatever reason, choose not to act.
As enforcement efforts expand, the likelihood of identifying and
successfully prosecuting antitrust violations increases, and illegal
conduct is thereby deterred. In these circumstances, the goals of
compensation and deterrence are complementary. Enhanced
compensation of victims through mandatory trebling encourages
enforcement by private attorney generals and the added private
enforcement strengthens overall deterrence.
Furthermore, the impact of a treble damages award on an antitrust
violator may be economically devastating and may be magnified in
conspiracy cases, since a defendant under the rule of joint and several
liability may be held responsible for all damages caused by its co-
conspirators trebled.31  Such catastrophic consequences provide a
27. Id. at 166 (noting the difficulties in reconstructing the "but for" market in section 2 cases).
28. Id.
29. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S 465, 472 (1982); see generally Steven C. Salop
& Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001,
1017-20 (1986) (explaining that modifying the treble damages remedy would lessen the
disincentive to engage in questionable business conduct because potential defendants would be
less likely to be sued and would face lower penalties if they were sued and lost).
30. AMC REPORT, supra note 14, at 246-47.
31. See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (no right of
contribution among antitrust defendants).
2010] 633
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powerful disincentive to engage in illegal activity. So devastating is the
impact of a treble damages judgment that antitrust violators may fear
civil antitrust liability even more than criminal sanctions, making them
less likely to avail themselves of the Antitrust Division's Leniency
Program.32 That realization led Congress to limit the civil liability of
Leniency Program participants to actual damages.33
Moreover, from a deterrence perspective, multiplying actual damages
is necessary because some violations of the antitrust laws invariably go
undetected.34 In theory, a defendant, in weighing the potential rewards
of illegal behavior against the concomitant risk of detection and
prosecution, discounts the gains from its illegal conduct by the
probability of detection. 35 A multiple is necessary to force the violator
to equate liability with damages caused.36 For example, if the
probability of detection and prosecution is one in six, then six would be
the appropriate multiple.3
7
Under this view, trebling would be appropriate only where the
probability of detection is one in three. Accordingly, trebling may be
too low a multiple for concealable offenses such as price-fixing, and
may be too high for unconcealed acts which may be illegal, such as
product bundling and certain merger activity. 38  However, this
theoretical approach does not translate easily into a legal rule because it
would be impractical, if not impossible, ex ante to compute the
likelihood of detection-whether one in three, one in ten, or one in
twenty-and hence the proper multiple for each industry for each
32. See Scott D. Hammond, Acting Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., An Overview of Recent
Developments in the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program (Jan. 10, 2005),
available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.htm (detailing recent developments and
improvements within the Antiturst Division's Criminal Enforcement Program). Under the
Corporate Leniency Policy, a corporation is entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution under
the following conditions: (1) the corporation is the first entity to report the wrongdoing to the
Antitrust Division; (2) upon learning of the wrongdoing, the corporation took prompt action to
terminate its participation; (3) the corporation cooperates with the Antitrust Division; (4) the
admission is corporate and not just individual in nature; (5) where possible the corporation makes
restitution to injured parties; and (6) the corporation is not the ring leader in the conspiracy. See
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf. A similar policy exists for individuals.
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS (1994), available
at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lenind.htm.
33. Standards Dev. Org. Advancement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 102-201, 118
Stat. 661,661-70 (2004).
34. See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 454.
35. Id. at 455, 458-60.
36. Id. at 454-55.
37. Id. at 455.
38. Id. at 454.
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antitrust violation.39 Here, trebling provides not only rough justice but
also a predictable, workable rule of law that can be easily administered
by the courts.
Finally, deterrence is significantly enhanced through the class action
mechanism. 40 It is one thing for a defendant to be sued by a single
plaintiff for a single overcharge. It is quite another for a defendant to be
sued by a plaintiff on behalf of tens of thousands of similarly situated
victims of antitrust violations. A defendant facing treble damage
liability to a large class of plaintiffs is much more apt to think twice
about pursuing an illegal course of conduct.
3. Disgorgement
Third, trebling makes it unlikely that antitrust violators will profit
from their wrongdoing. 41 Theoretically, trebling is not necessary to
bring about disgorgement of ill-gotten gains because plaintiffs' actual
damages would presumably correspond to defendants' actual illicit
gains. However, the reality is that plaintiffs are unlikely to invest the
time and money in prosecuting a lengthy, complicated, and expensive
civil antitrust claim if their recovery is limited to actual damages.42
Without trebling, therefore, antitrust violators may not be sued and may
be more likely to reap the benefits of their illegal conduct. Trebling, on
the other hand, assures that antitrust violators will be denied the fruits of
their misconduct, even if all the victims of their wrongdoing do not
come forward to claim their rightful share of damages.43
4. Punishment
Fourth, the treble damages remedy has a punitive element.44 In this
respect, the treble damage remedy is not unique to antitrust. Punitive
damages were imposed at common law cases of intentional or malicious
wrongdoing.45  Moreover, Congress has chosen to impose multiple
damages in certain instances, most notably for RICO 4 6 and insider
39. Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 103.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
41. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982).
42. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 455.
43. See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 124-25 (expressing the view that the Antitrust Division
should institute more actions seeking disgorgement to compensate for a dearth of private civil
monopolization cases).
44. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1955) (trebling
"presupposes a punitive purpose").
45. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OFTORTS § 381, at 1062-66 (2001).
46. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006).
2010]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
trading violations,47 both to punish and to discourage undesirable
conduct.48
II. THE PRIVATE REMEDY UNDER ATTACK
Historically, the Supreme Court has given effect to the broad
remedial purposes of the private right of action in antitrust cases.
49
More recently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,50 and Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,51 the Supreme
Court changed its tune and now clearly views the private action with
skepticism. Four themes articulating this skepticism emerge from
Trinko and Twombly: (1) fear of false positives; (2) lack of confidence
in judges and juries to achieve correct outcomes; (3) the inability of
federal judges to manage antitrust litigation in a cost-effective manner;
and (4) a preference for regulation over judicial intervention. 52
Trinko cautions that the "cost of false positives counsels against an
undue expansion of § 2 liability" under the Sherman Act.53 The Court
expressed concern that Verizon's failure to provide services required by
the Telecommunications Act may be unrelated to alleged antitrust
exclusion:
One false-positive risk is that an incumbent LEC's [Local Exchange
Carrier] failure to provide a service with sufficient alacrity might have
nothing to do with exclusion. Allegations of violations of § 251 (c)(3)
duties are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because
they are highly technical, but also because they are likely to be
extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and constantly
changing interaction of competitive and incumbent LECs
implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations. Amici
States have filed a brief asserting that competitive LECs are threatened
with "death by a thousand cuts"-the identification of which would
surely be a daunting task for a generalist antitrust court. Judicial
oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to distort
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (d)(3)(A) (2006).
48. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (treble damages
intended to punish as well as deter).
49. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982). ("The act is comprehensive in
its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated.").
50. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
51. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
52. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph of
Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV. LITIG. 1,
28-30 (2008) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Twombly] (elaborating on these themes as they are
developed in Trinko and Twombly).
53. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
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investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop the
variety of litigation routes already available to and actively pursued by
competitive LECs.5
4
The Court further noted that even under the best of circumstances, the
application of the antitrust laws "can be difficult" and that the mistaken
inference of anticompetitive effect "[is] especially costly, because [it]
chill[s] the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. 55
Twombly emphasizes the need to avoid false positives, refusing to
condemn conduct "just as much in line with a wide swath of rational
and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market. '
56
Second, Trinko expresses a lack of confidence in the court system to
achieve correct outcomes in exclusionary conduct cases.57 The Court
points out that Verizon's failure to comply with the technology sharing
requirements under the Telecommunications Act may be difficult for an
antitrust court to evaluate "not only because they are highly technical,
but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the
incessant, complex and constantly changing interaction" of the parties. 58
Accordingly, identifying exclusionary behavior would prove a
"daunting task" for "generalist" antitrust courts.59
Trinko also suggests that antitrust courts are ill-equipped to handle
the day-to-day supervision of the implementation of a "highly detailed
decree." 60  At the very least, antitrust intervention in the
telecommunications field is likely to lead to costly "interminable
litigation." 61 Trinko urges judicial self-restraint, concluding that the
Sherman Act "does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a
monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other
approach might yield greater competition." 62
Third, Twombly expresses skepticism about the ability of federal
judges to manage litigation, and pessimism about the usefulness of the
Federal Rules as a tool to promote cost-efficient litigation that yields
just outcomes. 63 The Court gives short shrift to any argument that
54. Id.
55. Id. at 414.
56. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
57. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at415.
61. Id. at 414.
62. Id. at 415-16.
63. Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
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baseless claims in federal court can be eliminated by careful case
management, control of discovery, summary judgment, or carefully
crafted jury instructions:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to
relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through "careful case management," given the common lament that
the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has
been on the modest side. And it is self-evident that the problem of
discovery abuse cannot be solved by "careful scrutiny of evidence at
the summary judgment stage," much less "lucid instructions to juries;"
the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings. Probably,
then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level
suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no "reasonably founded
hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence" to
support a § 1 claim. 64
The Twombly approach represents a marked departure from its ruling
a decade earlier in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit,65 wherein Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the Court, categorically rejected judicially created enhanced pleading
standards in favor of summary judgment and judicial control of
discovery as vehicles to eliminate infirm claims. 66
Pessimism about the efficacy of judicial management under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be linked to Judge Easterbrook's
1989 law review article in which he observed that courts are virtually
powerless to control the costs of discovery. 67 That assessment, which
was questionable even in 1989, is certainly not accurate today.
Although it is true that parties control the claims to be presented in the
first instance, courts--contrary to Judge Easterbrook's statement-are
not powerless. Indeed, the Federal Rules encourage active case
management by the courts. For example, Rule 16 permits courts sua
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
66. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under §
1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is
a result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment, federal courts and
litigants must rely on summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later.
Id. (emphasis added).
67. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 638 (1989).
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sponte to dismiss claims lacking merit.68  Courts may also order
targeted discovery with respect to limited issues with a goal of
entertaining a summary judgment motion at an early stage in a
lawsuit.69
Nor is it true that courts have no control over the discovery process.
With the 1983 Amendments, the Federal Rules began to establish the
case management model for the judge. Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) was added
to limit discovery to that which is proportional to the needs of the
case.70 Where the cost of discovery outweighs its benefits, the party
seeking such discovery faces mandatory sanctions.71 Similarly, a party
can be sanctioned for seeking discovery that is redundant or not cost-
effective. 7
2
It is simply not possible that the Court in Twombly was unaware of
these developments under the Federal Rules. Similarly, it is highly
unlikely that the Court was unaware of empirical research
demonstrating that discovery abuse leading to excessive pretrial costs
was not a problem in the vast majority of cases filed in the federal
courts.73 The real question is why the Court conveniently chose to
ignore these developments.
Fourth, Trinko expresses a distinct preference for regulation over
antitrust intervention. 74 The Court urges that the greater the regulatory
overlay, the less appropriate the use of antitrust intervention. 75 Trinko
reasons that in certain cases "regulation significantly diminishes the
likelihood of major antitrust harm."76 The Court further concludes that
antitrust intervention in highly regulated industries is likely to lead to
duplicative enforcement and liability.77 Finally, Trinko maintains that
regulators rather than generalist courts are best suited to supervise and
evaluate complicated decrees. 78
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
69. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3).
72. Id.
73. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery; How Bad Are The Problems?, 67 A.B.A. J. 450,
456 (1981) (summarizing a 1979 American Bar Association study on discovery abuses).
74. Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at411-13.
78. Id. at 414-15.
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III. LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
What can be learned from the American experience with the private
antitrust remedy? As a threshold matter, it is readily apparent that the
American model for private antitrust enforcement is viewed with
considerable skepticism abroad. At the George Washington University
Law School Conference on Private Enforcement of Competition Law in
February 2009, a surprising number of European presenters described
the American system as a "toxic cocktail." 79
The American private remedy system in antitrust is not perfect, but to
characterize it as a "toxic cocktail" is both harsh and misleading. The
term is harsh because it suggests that the American private remedy is
without benefit. As demonstrated above,80 that suggestion is patently
false; the private remedy is in many respects salutary. The term is
misleading in that it suggests that private recovery regimes are
inherently defective. Again, that is simply not the case. Indeed, the
principal concerns with the private antitrust remedy in the United States
identified by the Supreme Court in Trinko81 and Twombly82 would seem
to stem primarily from features of a civil justice system that are
uniquely American: (1) notice pleading; (2) broad pretrial discovery;
and (3) jury trials. 83 Courts abroad have administered private remedies
for centuries without such procedural features and surely could design a
system of private antitrust enforcement that would not necessitate
adoption of these mechanisms. Accordingly, procedural differences
may immunize antitrust regimes in the EU and elsewhere from many of
the problems experienced by American courts in administering the
private antitrust remedy.
A. Substantive Issues
That immunity, however, is not complete. Antitrust enforcers abroad
will have to address at least five important, largely substantive issues:
79. See e.g., Press Release, Europa, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress - Questions
and Answers, Nov. 27, 2008, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO//08/741 &format=HTML (describing the following
elements of American class actions as part of a "toxic cocktail": (1) contingency fees; (2) treble
damages; (3) pretrial discovery; and (4) opt-out, as opposed to opt-in, class actions).
80. See, supra notes 13-48 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for the private
treble damages remedy).
81. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
82. Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 559 (2007).
83. See Gregory P. Olsen, International Developments: Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation
in the EU, 20 ANTITRUST 73 (Fall 2005) (noting that liberal discovery rules, jury trials, and
contingency fees appear to be the source of perceived "excesses" of the American system)
(quotations omitted).
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(1) false positives; (2) enhanced damages; (3) private actions versus
regulation; (4) early identification and elimination of baseless claims;
and (5) the desirability of some form of class action recovery. In
addition, foreign enforcers must address at least two procedural issues:
(1) access to proof and (2) access to legal counsel.
1. False Positives and False Negatives
Unquestionably, any private enforcement regime must seek to
minimize false positives-those cases in which individuals are
mistakenly prosecuted-also known as Type I error. Such cases may
chill aggressive competition and innovation. Trinko84 and Twombly85
underscore the costs of false positives to the competitive process and to
the civil justice system. Both cases, however, are silent on the issue of
false negatives-those cases in which wrongdoers mistakenly escape
punishment-also known as Type II error. Failure to bring cases that
should be brought and thus allowing wrongdoers to escape punishment
surely harms competition. Simply put, the cost of false negatives is at
least as great as the cost of false positives. Yet, both Trinko and
Twombly appear to say that the system must at times tolerate certain
anticompetitive conduct in order to avoid false positives. 86
An effective system of private remedies must account for both false
positives and false negatives. Where there is a private right of action,
the risk of false positives cannot be eliminated without sacrificing
deterrence; but, as discussed below, it can be minimized by providing a
mechanism for early legal challenges to a claim and by policing damage
awards and avoiding those awards that are windfalls to successful
plaintiffs. The mere possibility that error will creep into the system
should not effectively veto an otherwise sound enforcement policy.
2. Multiple Damages
Critical to any scheme of private antitrust remedies is a properly
calibrated system for setting the appropriate level of money damages.
The first question is whether the private remedial scheme should
provide for actual or multiple damages. If multiple damages are
appropriate, the second question is what multiple should be applied to
actual damages.
84. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.
85. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557-58.
86. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (noting both the high cost of antitrust litigation and the
difficulty that courts have in evaluating the merits of exclusionary behavior).
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a. Multiple or Actual Damages
As discussed above, 87 the case for multiple damages in private
antitrust actions is compelling. First, many antitrust violations are
covert; hence, they are difficult to detect and prosecute. Second,
antitrust violations may so dislocate competitive conditions as to make
re-creation of a "but for" market as a yardstick for damages impossible.
In that regard, multiple damages may provide rough justice for injured
plaintiffs. 88 Third, antitrust litigation is both complex and costly,
making it an even riskier enterprise than other forms of litigation.
Multiple damages provide an incentive to undertake the enhanced risk
of litigating private antitrust suits. Fourth, multiple damages provide a
higher degree of deterrence than actual damages. Fifth, some types of
antitrust violations, such as horizontal price-fixing, serve no purpose
other than to destroy competition and therefore should be punished. 89
On the other hand, multiple damages may be harsh in those cases
where the conduct is (1) open or not covert, (2) not clearly illegal but
rather close to the line, and (3) potentially beneficial to the consumer.90
These insights have created some dissent about mandatory trebling in
the United States.91 Here, there are two schools of thought: one would
eliminate enhanced damages altogether; the other would eliminate
enhanced damages selectively. 92 The former concept is radical and
without significant mainstream support. Selective enhancement,
however, does have broader appeal.
Nevertheless, the supporters of selective enhancement of damages
have failed to come forward with a coherent, workable, and fair
mechanism for damage enhancement. One approach is to limit
enhanced damages to cases falling within the per se category. 93 That
87. See supra notes 13-48 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale for treble damages
in private antitrust actions).
88. But see WOUTER P.J. WiLS, THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW: A
STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 19 (Kluwer ed. 2002).
The trebling of damages could be looked at favorably as compensating for less than
unitary probability of apprehension, but it is too crude a method to serve that function.
It appears to overstate the likelihood of apprehension for concealable offenses such as
price fixing, and to understate it for other easily detectable offenses, including most
exclusionary practices.
Id.
89. See, e.g., Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust, supra note 13 (arguing that the treble damages
remedy is problematic in some cases but that it must not be abandoned because it ensures that the
antitrust laws are vigilantly enforced).
90. Id. at 794-98.
91. Id.at787.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 825-26.
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category, however, has been significantly narrowed by the courts and
continues to shrink with each passing year. A second approach would
be to have enhanced damages only where conduct is covert. In this
scenario, conduct that is open-tying arrangement, bundled discounts,
exclusive dealing-would give rise to actual damages only.94  This
approach ignores the fact that overt conduct can also have pernicious
effects on competition that are as devastating as covert conduct.95 A
third approach would leave enhancement to the discretion of the courts
on a case-by-case basis. In short, determining where to draw the line
between actual and enhanced damages is no easy task. No consensus
has emerged on where to draw the line and, largely for that reason
alone, initiatives to modify or eliminate treble damages have run
aground in the United States.
Equally important, the mandatory trebling requirement is not without
virtue. It provides a simple, efficient, predictable rule of damages that
is easy for the courts to administer. In marked contrast, a rule of
discretionary enhancement would lengthen private litigation, add to its
costs, and perhaps introduce an element of unfairness to the process of
measuring damages.96 Mandatory trebling has been a key element in a
remedies regime that has evolved over the last 120 years in the United
States and created a delicate antitrust ecosystem. If that ecosystem is
modified by elimination of mandatory trebling, the private enforcement
system may suffer significantly.
b. Amount of the Multiplier
Assuming that enhancement is desirable, the next question is how
large the multiplier should be. The extent to which the American
experience with mandatory trebling is helpful here is unclear. Although
there is some common law precedent for trebling, the American concept
of treble damage is rooted as much in a sense of rough justice as it is in
legal theory. A multiplier of four or more would be unacceptably
draconian. This leaves us with a choice of double or treble damages or
something in between. 97
Query whether double rather than treble damage would adversely
impact private enforcement. In theory, reducing damages by one-third
94. Jd. at 831-32.
95. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 73-74 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that
Microsoft's deal with Apple "must be regarded as anticompetitive" because its exclusive contract
with Apple "has a substantial effect in restricting distribution of rival browsers" and serves to
protect Microsoft's monopoly because it reduces the usage share of rival browsers).
96. See Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust, supra note 13, at 841.
97. Id. at 839.
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would lessen deterrence. However, the fact remains that in the United
States very few antitrust cases are litigated to verdict and judgment. 98
Most cases settle for amounts that more closely approximate actual
damages than treble damages. Moreover, double damages provide
nearly the same incentives to sue for private plaintiffs as trebling.
An intermediate approach would be to give the courts discretionary
authority to impose up to treble damages. 99 Under this model, the court
would be free to impose actual damages, treble damages, or an amount
in between.100 Ordinarily, hardcore price fixing would call for treble
damages.10' Exclusionary conduct occasioned by illegal tying would
ordinarily result in actual damages under this approach. 10 2 Predatory
pricing or other abuse of dominance might call for double damages.
This approach may add to the cost of antitrust litigation by necessitating
a penalty phase in every case and also make antitrust litigation even less
predictable. On the other hand, it is a fairer rule because it permits the
courts to consider the facts peculiar to each case. 10 3 Thus, none of these
approaches are perfect. Enforcement authorities must make a careful
assessment of each model before adopting a remedies regime.
3. Private Action Versus Regulation
As discussed above, 104 Trinko and Twombly express skepticism about
the ability of judges to achieve correct outcomes in antitrust cases and a
preference to have certain antitrust issues addressed through regulation
rather than by the courts. The Supreme Court's advocacy of regulation
over private antitrust enforcement seems anomalous given the
widespread recognition that regulation creates costly inefficiencies. It is
particularly anomalous in light of the federal government's shift toward
deregulation in transportation, communication, and energy distribution,
which began over thirty years ago and continues to this day. 105
98. See, e.g., Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 8, 246 (1981) (statement of
Hubert L. Will, Senior U.S. District J. of the Northern District of Illinois) ("Something over 90
percent-actually 92 percent of all civil cases and roughly 89 percent of antitrust cases-are
settled."); David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 N.D. L. REv. 1247, 1292
(2009) ("From 1979 to 2000, only 3.17% of all cases filed in federal court went to trial.").
99. See Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust, supra note 13, at 838.
100. Id. at 838-41.
101. Id. at 839.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 838-41.
104. See supra notes 50-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
skepticism of private antitrust actions).
105. See, e.g., The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 and 47 U.S.C.) (deregulating local phone
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More fundamentally, the Supreme Court's professed lack of
confidence in the judiciary 0 6 is suspect. There is no body of data
supporting the view that courts are inept on antitrust issues. On the
contrary, the courts have shown over the years to be equal to the task.
The same is true of antitrust regimes abroad. The private right of action
provides individuals and entities an important avenue of relief that
should not be foreclosed.
4. Combating Baseless Litigation
Given the burdens of antitrust litigation, both as to the cost to
litigants and the greater demands on judicial time, it is imperative that a
litigation system have a reliable mechanism for weeding out baseless
claims as well as claims that while not baseless, cannot possibly
succeed at trial. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
designed to police baseless claims. 10 7 Among American litigators, the
reaction to Rule 11 is decidedly mixed. Some feel that it works well;
others believe that it impairs civil litigation. 10 8
In Twombly, the Supreme Court made clear its lack of confidence in
Rule 11 as a screen for meritless cases. 10 9 Rather, the Supreme Court
would prefer to dismiss cases on the merits where the allegations in the
complaint do not allege facts that make out a "plausible" antitrust
violation.110 Post-Twombly, the courts are still trying to decode the
cryptic term "plausible,"' a task that will likely take years. In the
meantime, the lower courts have been empowered, if not emboldened,
service).
106. See Verizon Commc'n, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (noting that applying section 2 "can be difficult").
107. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
108. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1986, at DI.
Lewin summarizes the debate between sanctions skeptics led by then-Chief Judge Jack B.
Weinstein (arguing that sanctions have "become another way of harassing the opponent and
delaying the case") and sanctions advocates, such as Arthur Miller ("Rule 11 is a useful weapon
against unnecessary litigation."). Id. (quotations omitted).
109. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 559 (2007).
110. Id.
I 11. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). In lqbal the Supreme Court explained that
"[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1949
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court then enunciated a two-step procedure for
determining the sufficiency of the complaint. Id. at 1949-50. First, courts should assume that
factual allegations are true; mere conclusory allegations "are not entitled to the assumption of
truth." Id. at 1950. Second, applying judicial experience and common sense, the court must
ascertain whether the well-pleaded factual allegations are plausible, that is, whether they would
permit the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Id. at 1949-50.
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to dismiss antitrust claims at the motion to dismiss phase 1 12 -a point at
which the court knows least about the merits of the case.
In Europe, shifting of attorneys' fees under the "loser pays" standard
provides a strong deterrent to baseless litigation. Still, it is critical that
courts have the power to dismiss insubstantial, though not baseless,
claims at the outset of the case. Dismissal prior to trial, however, is a
potent weapon that must be exercised with great care. Courts must be
mindful that antitrust cases are complex and often difficult to prove and
be careful to ensure that meritorious claims have their day in court. The
United States, under Twombly, which was an effort to ease the financial
burdens of defending antitrust suits and to avoid false positives, seems
to have tilted the playing field decidedly in the defendant's favor. 113
Antitrust regimes abroad must be careful to strike a balance between the
right to prosecute a claim and the right to be free from insubstantial
claims.
5. Representative Litigation
Given that adoption of a private antitrust enforcement scheme is
likely to increase the workload of the courts, some form of
representative litigation is desirable to ensure that civil dockets remain
manageable.
American style class actions probably do not offer an appropriate
template. 114 Unlike their European counterparts, American class action
attorneys are entrepreneurs. Attorneys investigate and uncover
wrongdoing; attorneys then seek clients and not vice versa. 115
Moreover, American class action attorneys typically operate on a
contingency fee basis. 116 Once a class has been certified by the court,
members are bound by any judgments unless they opt-out of the
class.117  In Europe, contingency fees have been strongly resisted. 118
Moreover, "loser pays" schemes are the norm in Europe, and that
112. See, e.g., In re Travel Agent Comrn'n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir.
2009); In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007); Bailey Lumber & Supply
Co. v. Ga. Pac. Corp., No. 1:08CV1394 LG-JMR, 2009 WL 2425973, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 6,
2009); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Versata Enter., Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 395, 403-04 (D. Del.
2009); Synergetics USA, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 08 CIV. 3669(DLC), 2009 WL 435299, at
*4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2009) (all holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under Twombly).
113. See Cavanagh, Twombly, supra note 52, at 33.
114. See Olsen, supra note 83, at 73.
115. Id. at 75.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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approach would simply not mesh well with an American style "opt out"
class mechanism. 119
However, the concept of "collective action" 120 lawsuits is not
unknown in Europe. A remedial scheme featuring an "opt in" class that
also obligated class members to pay a proportionate share of attorneys'
fees if the action were unsuccessful could work in Europe.
121
Designated consumer groups, rather than representatives assembled by
an entrepreneurial attorney, could represent injured consumers. 122
Much like the American class action, a collective action could make it
cost-effective to litigate when individual claims are relatively small,
thereby denying offending defendants from retaining their ill-gotten
gains.
B. Procedural Issues
The American experience also sheds light on the two most pressing
procedural issues relating to the private antitrust remedy: access to both
proof and attorneys.
1. Access to Proof
Access to proof is a key component of a private right of action for
antitrust violations. In the typical antitrust case, there is an asymmetry
of information, usually favoring the defendant, especially where covert
activity is involved. In the United States, this asymmetry is addressed
by pretrial discovery in order to provide equal access to proof.
However, pretrial discovery is largely alien to civil law regimes. 123
Although the concept of greater pretrial discovery in European civil
litigation "is neither radical nor particularly novel,"1 24 resistance to
enlarged discovery rights in private antitrust action is firmly embedded
in the European litigation culture. 125 Opponents of pretrial disclosure
see no need for special rules in antitrust cases and fear that adoption of
discovery rules across the board would prove both costly and
disruptive. 126  Yet, without some form of pretrial discovery, the
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Press Release, Europa, supra note 80 (observing that 13 European countries
(France, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Austria and the UK) have introduced "collective redress schemes").
121. Olsen, supra note 83, at 75.
122. Id.
123. Pheasant, supra note 6, at 59.
124. Id. at60.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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prospects for successful private actions are bleak, except for those cases
that follow government enforcement actions. 127 This is not to say that
the American system of broad pretrial disclosure is necessary. A more
limited discovery regime could prove adequate. An approach that could
work is a system of court-ordered discovery of documents relevant to
the claim and defenses in private actions. 128
2. Access to Attorneys
The United States-based contingency fee system, wherein an attorney
represents a plaintiff but gets paid only if successful, does not mesh well
with the European system where the loser pays the prevailing party's
attorneys' fees. Moreover, the loser pays system, itself, may well chill
meritorious claims, given the unpredictability of litigation outcomes
generally and the complexity of antitrust cases in particular. While the
United States contingency fee model has been criticized for stirring up
baseless litigation, 129 the loser pays regime may be attacked for being
inhospitable to meritorious antitrust suits.
In short, something has to give in the traditional European litigation
system if the private right of action is to have any meaningful impact on
antitrust enforcement. Elimination of the loser pays scheme seems out
of the question. Still, some compromise measures may work. For
example, successful plaintiffs might be awarded an attorneys' fee
premium. 130 Another approach might be to require a losing antitrust
plaintiff to pay the attorneys' fees of successful defendants only when
the court finds that the claims asserted are baseless. Without some
adjustment in current litigation practices of European courts to permit
access to attorneys by private antitrust plaintiffs, the private right of
action may never get off the ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
The continuing debate over the merits of the private antitrust remedy
in the United States provides valuable lessons to regimes abroad that are
weighing the pros and cons of a private remedies scheme. Writing on a
blank slate, these regimes have a unique opportunity to learn from the
American experience and to make a quantum leap forward in global
antitrust enforcement. The private right of action is an important and
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Walter Olson, IBA Report: Contingency Fees as an Incentive to Excessive Litigation (on
file with author).
130. Id.
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effective weapon in preserving free markets, in detecting and punishing
antitrust violators, and in deterring future violations. The key task is to
extract the positive elements from the American system while at the
same time avoiding its shortcomings. In the process, competition
authorities will have little choice but to sample the "toxic cocktail" and
may very well conclude that it is not so toxic after all.
131
131. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (referring to the U.S. combination of
contingency fees, punitive damages, pre-trial discovery and opt-out class actions as a "toxic
cocktail").
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